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The Age of Aquarius
The Reorientation of NASA after 1969
By Junichi Miyamoto

I. Introduction
On July 29, 1969, lobbyists for the National Aeronautics & Space Administration
(NASA) eagerly approached Congress regarding their budget ambitions for the following year,
hoping to capitalize upon their most recent accomplishment. Nine days before, humankind took
its very first step upon the surface of another world. The thrilling voyage of Apollo 11 was hailed
by the New York Times as not just a historical triumph but as a “step in evolution.”1 The elation
of the public was shared by those in the government as well who were thrilled by the fulfillment
of the seemingly impossible goal laid out by President John F. Kennedy eight years prior. When
the crew returned on July 24, President Richard M. Nixon hailed them calling the past days “the
greatest week in the history of the world since Creation.”2
So understandably, the NASA representatives on the 29th were dumbfounded by Capitol
Hill’s earthbound reception. With the task complete, many wondered why NASA was asking for
another $225 million for more Apollo missions when the nation was imperiled in a massive
fiscal commitment to a souring war in Vietnam. In the days before, Vice President Agnew was
quick to set a new goal for American space science declaring that Americans would walk on
Mars before the end of the century. Surprisingly, one of NASA’s chief congressional allies, New
Mexico Senator Clinton P. Anderson, soberly retorted saying that from now on, NASA should
take a “go-slow” approach.3
And go-slow they did. In the subsequent years, the government’s enthusiastic support for
the institution came to a screeching halt. In 1970 and 1971, NASA was buffeted by a series of
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John W. Finney, “Apollo’s Success May Bring Fund Cut,” New York Times, July 30, 1969, New York edition.
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gargantuan slashes to its budget.45 The 12.5% cut in 1970 led to the cancellation of what would
have been Apollo 18, 19, and 20.6 By 1970, NASA’s continued survival seemed uncertain.

7

Still, NASA did go on. And, in spite of these setbacks from congressional budget cuts,
the NASA budget (Table 1) steadily increased since the harrowing budgetary troubles of the
early 1970s. From this, it can be seen that somehow, NASA managed to stem the tide and by
1985, apparently reverse it. Unlike other aspects of the space program, this phenomenon has
4

Richard D. Lyon, “12.5% Slash in NASA Funding Will Force Sharp Program Cut,” New York Times, February 3,
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Table 1: Source of numbers from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
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Budget: http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2010/assets/hist04z1.xls.
Inflation calculated with the Bureau of Labor Statistics index for 2009:
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm.

gone largely uninvestigated by historians. This paper will attempt to address this issue directly
by looking at NASA as an institution trying to navigate an unaccommodating sea of capricious
politicians and an apathetic public. But before an attempt to illustrate how NASA came to thrive,
it is necessary to discuss the body of literature that might intersect with the focus of this paper.
The body of historical literature that explores NASA in the years following Apollo is thin
as it treads upon the gray area that blurs history and current events. The works that do exist
almost focus exclusively on the characteristics and features of projects and events. For example,
Sylvia D. Fries has written stirring accounts of Space Shuttle Challenger and its impact on
American culture8 and how subsystems in the International Space Station were designed around
Congressional feuds.9 Both tap into the cultural and political milieu surrounding NASA but the
carefully engineered specificity of these studies limits their applicability to the broader interests
of this paper. Because these articles are purposefully limited in scope, it will be productive to
take a different path.
Others have made convincing cases concerning NASA and its role in the backdrop of
United States-Soviet relations. Works such as Rita G. Koman’s examination of the American
space program as a headlong gambit to defeat the Soviet Union in the arena of space after the
Sputnik humiliation10 get closer to the heart of this paper in scope but the conclusions reached by
these scholars are only tangentially applicable to NASA after 1969. While it is important to the
complete history, it is also impossible to fully designate NASA’s institutional spirit through the
lens of anti-communism because its primary role under this framework ended two decades
before the close of the Cold War.
8
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There are also a small amount of works that look at NASA with wide analytical breadth.
Scholars such as Herbert Friedman articulate a prevalent stance that views the moon landings as
the apex of the institution and that it has been on an indisputable trend of decline that accounts
for its modern day perils; today, NASA is “adrift in space,” a wandering, cumbersome relic well
past its prime that is best at reveling in the wispy memory of the bygone glory days.11 The
conclusions, however, deserve careful reexamination and reconsideration. First, one must
consider the evidence. The majority of the work relies on dire statements and warnings from
dissatisfied NASA bureaucrats but it is important to keep in mind that their job is to present
convincing cases to secure funding for their institution’s projects – it might be more problematic
if no one was complaining. Moreover, it is difficult to make this position compatible with the
clear budgetary successes of NASA in the last twenty years or so.
Although there is no direct literature that tackles the discrepancy between budget and
attitudes, there are appurtenant works that one can look at to create a model that offers an
explanation. A feature of science during the Cold War was the tension between science’s
inherent tendency to move towards broad-based international collaboration and the polarization
between communist nations and western democracies. Simone Turchetti et al explore a sphere of
this in a study on the role of internationalism in evolving the region of Antarctica from being
contended as grounds for nuclear submarines into its present day research orientation.12 The
argument is that diplomats used internationalism as a tool to defuse the potentially hostile
military situation by preemptively declaring and establishing research aimed footholds on the
continent. Although the article focuses on the geopolitical implications, one can infer that there
were significant consequences for the sciences as a result of the political activity. Institutions and
11
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expeditions were funded and established that otherwise would have been shelved or
marginalized. New outgrowths of science thrived in this international and collaborative
environment, a strong counterpoint to the intense partisanship that allowed NASA to thrive in the
same decade. This paper will argue that NASA sought relief after the end of the moon landings
by crafting a platform out of the spirit of transnational cooperation.
Budget is, of course, only a part of the story; it is the readily apparent end result of a
concerted and unified theme that NASA administrators have repeatedly and artfully executed in
a series of bids to protect and further their interests. As NASA found itself without the
disciplining patronage of an alert and interested government, there was a shift in institutional
posture. With their resources freed from the centripetal pull of nationalistic forces bent on
winning the Space Race, NASA’s energy was dedicated to projects that had a distinct
cosmopolitan tint. A cursory glance at NASA’s marquee projects since Apollo makes this clear;
the remnants of the scrapped Apollo program, the Space Shuttles, and the various space stations
started the trend of missions inviting foreign astronauts. Today, a multinational crew is a
routinized and common feature of NASA missions.13 NASA’s unmanned space program tapped
into this spirit as well with the data returned to Earth open to international academia; nowadays,
scientists from around the world can easily apply to get direct time with the orbiting space
telescopes and some unprocessed mission data is even available to at-home amateur armchair
analysts equipped with nothing but access to the internet.14
In the interim, it seems that this move was born out of necessity; NASA had no choice
but to pursue less costly projects. However, if we carefully delineate this shift from scientific
13
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nationalism to scientific internationalism, the acceleration of this change coincides with the
reclamation of the 1960s budget levels suggesting that this ideological transition became a
successfully deployed motif to expand influence and meet goals. A look at the NASA timeline
while keeping this in mind provides confirmation. As a result, this paper presents its findings in a
chronological structure which will be delineated in to three main sections. The study starts by
examining the impact of the postwar context on American space efforts and how this persisted
through the decades up until NASA’s first budgetary crises and how NASA’s survivalist
embrace of international collaboration to adapt to its new and unaccommodating situation
planted the seeds for future institutional latitude. Then, the paper demonstrates that with this
freedom from central dictations, NASA turned its infant internationalism into a fully fledged
umbrella that allowed for the protection and attainment of otherwise endangered objectives
throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. Finally, the study attempts to prove that this change
continued to foster more opportunities in the years after and that NASA’s most recent triumphs
and the features of modern space science today can be fitted in to a continuity that finds its
origins in the last forty years. It is also worth synthesizing and discussing these findings in a
conclusion that pieces this study with NASA scholarship and explores possible broader
implications and avenues for future study.
II. The Origins of Internationalism
One of the aftermaths of World War II was the Allied scramble to capture valuable
German technologies15 some of which included revolutions in aeronautics like the flying wing,
guided rockets, and jet engines. While most of this happened covertly in the background (e.g.
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Operation Paperclip16), the public in America and around the world also got the occasional
glimpse into the extent of German technological excellence and imagination.
Just a month or so after the end of the war in Europe, the Army announced to the news
organizations covering the war’s end in Paris that it had uncovered plans that prove Nazi
Germany was only “fifty or 100 years…[away from harnessing] the sun’s rays to demolish
nations at will and rule the world.”17 While a giant, orbiting magnifying glass that is capable of
killing humans like ants has always been impossible, impractical, and comically unwieldy, such
revelations irrevocably linked outer space with national security. Even after the realities of
scientific limitations and boundaries set in and public expectations were somewhat tempered,
scientists and policy makers routinely made the rounds to promote and discuss similar themes. In
1952, a scientist began to grandstand about the feasibility and applications of a man-made moon.
To him, this meant a space station functioning as an orbiting weapons platform and that
whichever nation built such a contraption first would enjoy an insurmountable advantage in the
arms race.18 When the Soviet Union realized the goal of an orbiting satellite with Sputnik, the
outrageous firestorm against President Dwight D. Eisenhower came from a horrified public
whose imagination was set alight by politicians like Senator Lyndon B. Johnson who claimed the
Soviets were just steps away from developing the capability to “[drop] bombs on us from space
like kids dropping rocks on to cars from freeway overpasses.”19 One can surmise from events a
year after that this was not all just routine political posturing and that some important figures
took such prognostications to heart; in 1958, British military officials openly wondered if the
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western defense grid was made obsolete by the Sputnik threat.20 Even though an orbiting bomb
lobber, let alone the envisaged Death Star of 1952, never materialized (and still has not today),
the tone for the American response was set down firmly. Space became an arena for foreign
policy and national security.
With these events in mind, the spike in the early 1960s NASA budget is accounted for.
The sense of national urgency brought to it a high point in funding that has not been matched
since.21 The likely and common reaction to this is to conclude that these were NASA’s golden
years where the organization enjoyed clear direction and near unanimous support from the public
and from Congress as is argued by Friedman. However, there are dimensions to the story that
might inspire different interpretations that are perhaps obscured by the obvious and glaring
specter of the unprecedented budget.
It is important to note that the enthusiasm from the public and Congress, and at times
even from the internal scientific community, was mostly qualified. These groups provided fierce
support for NASA – in 1963, when several Republican Senators began to question the wisdom
and motives of pouring four to five percent of the federal budget into NASA, Senator Clinton P.
Anderson openly challenged their patriotism22 – but this only happened if they felt NASA was
making sufficiently large strides towards the all important task of beating communism to the
moon. When NASA did not meet the expectations of its supporters, they only offered harsh
repudiation. One example where NASA ran afoul of its Congressional allies is the development
of the Centaur payload stage for the Saturn rockets. Problems plagued its early development and
when NASA persisted in conducting further tests, Congress launched an investigative hearing to
20
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censure NASA for wasting time and money on what Congress considered a proven failure.23
Ironically, Centaur was not only not the hapless dead-end it had been made out to be during the
hearing but after its successful deployment in 1965, it became one of the most used and reliable
workhorses of the NASA arsenal and remained in service for almost the next forty years.24
However the harsh Congressional criticism and negative publicity forced NASA to cancel
Centaur’s role in the Saturn rockets and the Apollo program and created a whole new component
to fulfill the role.25 Even some members of the scientific community outside of NASA lamented
this turn of events and were quick to criticize wondering if such missteps doomed America to
follow in the footsteps of the Soviet Union yet again.26
Looking back on these events, one must wonder if this period really constitutes a high
point for NASA. NASA was bound closely to the political watchdogs of Congressional
committees and existed in an age when the purity of scientific academia was intensely polarized
by the always looming battle with communism. The Centaur program seemed to be a genuine
attempt to conserve resources and to further develop a concept that had the trappings for success;
but because it clashed with the preset timeline of forces outside of NASA, it was nearly
abolished completely and smeared as a flagrant example of gross mismanagement. Even though
NASA was endowed with a deep budget, its identity as an agent of scientific pursuit was
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arguably compromised; experimentation and innovation, some of the most basic hallmarks of
science, were quashed if they came in conflict with the national security imperative.
Expedience is, of course, a point that any like organization has to contend with
perpetually (NASA would revisit some of these themes again with the publicity of future Space
Shuttle disasters, especially in the case of Challenger27). But in NASA’s history, the decade
following its rapid formation in 195828 was, without doubt, the height of the severity of these
clashes. It seems that it would be an error to equate the budget then with power and influence
since it was the growth of the budget that led to the suffocating oversight. Because of the single
track focus of the government, the triumph of the moon landing meant the withdrawal of
attention and with that, NASA’s enormous budgetary discretion. On the flip side, however, it
also meant NASA was no longer beholden to the policy goals of the Cold War.
Less than a year after the moon landing, NASA already found a way to operate separate
from the mindset of being locked in a mortal competition with a nemesis that had global
implications. It began the unprecedented step of talking to its Russian counterpart in order to
negotiate a design for a universal docking system to be used in a possible event that called for a
space rescue. In 1972, President Nixon and Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin signed an agreement

27

U.S. House. Committee on Science and Technology. Investigation of the Challenger Accident (Vol. 1). (HRG1986-TEC-0028; Date: June 10-12, 17, 18, 25, 1986). Text in: LexisNexis® Congressional Hearings Digital
Collection; Accessed: October 6, 2009. Dr. Richard Feynman would play critical role in illuminating surprising
gaping chasms between the realities in the minds of scientists and the expectations of the administrator by revealing
technical flaws in Challenger that were known but discounted for the sake of a speedy launch. This, and the
previously discussed clashes over specifics of Apollo, is good indicators of how bureaucrats might have the
sometimes tragically consequential ability to affect processes. However, it is still important to remember that the
bureaucrat can sometimes be more of an arm of the institution than an outsider emissary from the government. This
study demonstrates this by highlighting some of the ways in which the administrator clashed with the legislator.
28
Matt Bille, The First Space Race: Launching the World’s First Satellites (College Station: Texas A&M University
Press, 2004). On July, 29 1958, NASA was established after the enactment of the National Aeronautics and Space
Act. In many ways, its very formation was also steeped in the charged political climate of the time; it absorbed its
antecedent, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) in part because the government felt that
NACA lacked the agility necessary for a response to the Soviet Union and had done a poor job of keeping America
afoot in aerospace developments in light of Sputnik and the several failed American rocket launches immediately
after.

that called for an Apollo module to meet up with a Soviet spacecraft in 1975. This became the
Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) which involved docking the last usable Apollo command
module with a Soyuz spacecraft.29 On July 17, 1975, astronaut Thomas Stafford and cosmonaut
Alexei Leonov exchanged the first international handshake in space. The crews exchanged gifts
and interacted for nearly two days and conducted several joint experiments.30
In the context of the Cold War, ASTP is a fairly clear example of détente which was the
evolving policy orientation in both the United States and the Soviet Union; the scientists
responsible for initiating the negotiations were not expecting anything to come to fruition with
their existing technology and spacecraft and were quite surprised to learn that their governments
consented to and accelerated what was only a theoretical and academic dialogue.31 If we narrow
the focus to only NASA, it is also probably reasonable to consider it a mission crafted out of
frugality; after all, although the budget cuts ended Apollo, the leftover remnants were still
operable and adequate for a mission of some sort. But there are elements of this mission that may
be fitted to an overarching story.
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Above: One of the Collier’s issues that shared Dr. Wernher von Braun’s vision of travelling to Mars. Note the
complete absence of nationalistic insignia.

From 1952 to 1955, preeminent scientists and engineers at the behest of the government
partnered with Collier’s magazine and Disney’s movie studios to run a series of public interest

media pieces to promote the concept of space travel. American readers of Collier’s got a glimpse
of some of the visions of what future space travel might look like from prominent Space Age
figures like Willy Ley and Wernher von Braun. Colorful and detailed diagrams of spacecraft
bound for distant worlds like the Moon and Mars and depictions of future societies permanently
living in colossal space station habitats accompanied by clear and lucid descriptions of the
necessary technological requirements to execute them dominated the pages. Disney carried much
of the same imagery in video format in a three part movie series shown on television narrated by
Dr. von Braun.32
The nature of the images is particularly striking. Not a single American flag or
government insignia appeared on the spaceships illustrated in the Collier’s publications or the
Disney movies. This suggests that the idea of a transnational, if not fully international, ethos of
space exploration already lay embedded in the minds of the individuals that would become the
first important figures of NASA.33 Reinforcement for this transnational ethos can be found in
some of the writings of von Braun who, for all intents and purposes, was the face and heart of
NASA in the early going.34 In 1948, von Braun wrote a specific plan and vision for a future
mission to Mars called Das Marsprojekt,35 a work that supplied the basis for much of the
speculation, technical minutia, and illustrations of the magazine run and movies. While it was
primarily a technical manual, von Braun reflected upon the nature of humanity and space
exploration in the first few pages.

Since the actual development of the long-range liquid rocket, it has been
apparent that true space travel… can only be achieved by the coordinated might
of scientists, technicians, and organizers belonging to nearly every branch of
32
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modern science and industry… We space racketeers of all nations (where
permitted) have made it our business to rally this kind of talent around the
standard of space travel…

Even in a 1962 preface to an edition released at the height of the Space Race fervor, von
Braun refrained from the use of nation-specific terminology and phraseology and congratulated
all nations for the advances in rocketry up until that point in time (referring of course to the
United States and the Soviet Union). The conspicuous absence of nationalistic spirit illustrates
how the idea of cooperation beyond borders was so deeply embedded, a feature that helps to
account for the ease and speed of abandoning the intellectual wall dividing the American and
Soviet space communities.
However, it is worthy to note that the entire community was not completely unaffected
by the events of the 1960s and there were still obvious and glaring tensions. James C. Fletcher,
the head of NASA in 1973, attempted to secure more funding for NASA by resurrecting the
fading memories of the moon race and replacing NASA back into the Cold War geopolitical
milieu. Fletcher argued that the downward trend of scientific endeavors would force the United
States “to regroup our space industry team and outrace another Sputnik.”36 While the makings for
the cosmopolitan NASA of today were there and the first steps had already been taken towards
that destination, the change was only in its infancy.

III. Developing Internationalism
Throughout the 1970s, several developments evolved the space sciences even further and
created circumstances that made international outreach far easier to accept for NASA and the
American government. The push for this was already there, brought forth by the budget cuts that
left NASA grasping for ways to get funds and to lessen costs even from outside sources. But
36
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since the Cold War reached a boiling point in Vietnam37 and as Fletcher demonstrated in the
1973 NASA budget hearing, the Soviet Union was still considered in confrontational terms.
With the rise of the European Space Agency (ESA) in 1975, a group then comprised of
countries friendly to the United States most of whom were members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), the inhibition against reaching out to the foreign community was
substantially lowered. The idea for a space agency comprised of European member states arose
from the ashes of World War II. With Europe broken, scientists realized that to reach parity and
equal stature with the two superpowers would be impossible without drawing from the resources
and expertise of the collective.38 The organization was officially inaugurated with the merger of
two precursors [European Launch Development Organisation (ELDO) and European Space
Research Organisation (ESRO)] formed in the 1960s. While the ESA declared in their mission
statement that the goal of the organization was to promote the space sciences in and for European
states, it is important to note that the process was aided along and accelerated by the patronage of
the United States in the earlier years. Because the ESA had no payload rockets or launch
platforms, the first seven European satellites were put into orbit by NASA.39
And almost immediately, the relationship turned surprisingly bilateral with the American
space program drawing benefits from the ESA as well. In 1970, NASA unveiled a proposal for a
fleet of reusable manned spacecraft that would become the Space Shuttle. Because the
announcement came at the tail end of the costly Apollo launches, the plans for the Space Shuttle
came under hostile fire from almost all sides concerned about the cost.40 While NASA was
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forced to make massive concessions,41 it still persisted, in part because of promises to find ways
to pay for it without burdening the American taxpayer excessively. In 1972, just months before
President Nixon gave the go-ahead for the continuation of the program, NASA announced that
fifteen percent of the cost would be shouldered by the ESA in exchange for access to Space
Shuttle missions.42 The ESA contribution was not just monetary. Over time, they even had a
bridgehead on Capitol Hill, and began to function almost as NASA lobbyists; in 1989, ESA
representatives worked with NASA to reverse a vote that threatened to end a joint project.43
This pattern of cooperative two-way enabling became a consistently reappearing theme.
In 1978, NASA launched the International Ultraviolet Explorer (IUE) not just for the European
Space Agency but as a partner in the program that promised to share data access with
astronomers from seventeen other nations.44 A daring joint NASA/ESA project involving a close
rendezvous with the returning Halley’s Comet in 1986 was scrapped because of cost and the
Challenger disaster but was resurrected with even broader goals under the conglomerated aegis
of NASA, the ESA, the Russian Federal Space Agency or Roskosmos (RKA), and Japan’s
Institute of Space and Astronautical Sciences (ISAS).45
However, the spirit of the times was not invariably transnational despite the changing
tenor of space exploration. A well-known 1987 study commissioned by James C. Fletcher and
41
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led by Sally Ride, the first American woman to go to space in 1983, titled NASA Leadership and
America’s Future in Space46 (henceforth called the Ride Report) utilized the same old Cold War
language to warn the government and the public that a decreased budget and loss of interest in
NASA meant the cessation of leadership in key areas of space exploration. The report observed
that
The Soviets are now the sole long-term inhabitants of low-Earth orbit. The first,
and only, U.S. space station, Skylab, was visited by three crews of astronauts
before it was vacated in 1974; the U.S. has had no space station since. The
Soviets have had eight space stations in orbit since the mid-1970s. The latest,
Mir, was launched in 1986 and could accommodate cosmonauts and scientific
experiments for nearly a decade before the U.S. Space Station can accommodate
astronauts in 1995. The United States has clearly lost leadership in these two
areas, and is in danger of being surpassed in many others during the next several
years.47

Despite the alarming tone, a later passage belies the softening definition of leadership by
conceding that “leadership does not require that the U.S. be preeminent in all areas and
disciplines of space enterprise. In fact, the broad spectrum of space activities and the increasing
number of spacefaring nations make it virtually impossible for any nation to dominate in this
way.”48 This marks a clear departure from the embarrassment of being defeated in even one way
that characterized and functioned as the engine of the space program in the 1950s and 1960s.
The text of the Ride Report is not the only evidence of multinational collaboration. Some
of the missions pushed for by the Ride Report ended up assuming a distinct internationalist
orientation despite the report’s insistence that “the United States will not be a leader in the 21st
century if it is dependent on other countries for access to space or for the technologies required
to explore the space frontier.” One of the projects reviewed was a daring plan conceived in 1982
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to study Saturn on an unprecedented scale. Although the report describes this as a mission to be
carried out by NASA alone, the finalized plans in 1988 for Cassini-Huygens, one of NASA’s
most highly publicized unmanned missions, called for deep and extensive cooperation with the
ESA. The ESA would not just be a partner but be the preeminent contributor with the headlining
Huygens space probe, a spacecraft with the milestone mission to explore and impact Saturn’s
mysterious moon, Titan.49 In fact, NASA acceded to this preeminence specifically to remedy the
ESA’s growing disenchantment at being confined to ancillary roles.50

Left: The record on Voyager 2 with Earth sounds. Right: A diagram explaining the meaning of the symbols on the
plaque carried by the four deep space bound satellites.

The scientific relationship for Cassini-Huygens also involved an agreement allowing the
equal and full distribution of access to the data gathered from the satellite and the probe.
However, this was not unique to this program. It came after a long line of unmanned space
probes throughout the 1970s and 1980s that initiated the process of declassifying mission data.
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Unlike the moon rocks which were guarded jealously for several years51 or the findings of earlier
satellites (e.g. Explorer 1) which were released only after exclusive review by American
scientists,52 the updates from the missions of the interplanetary flyby spacecraft Pioneer 10,
Pioneer 11, Voyager 1, and Voyager 2 were viewable simultaneously around the world.
Interestingly, scientific questions arising from their ongoing operation today are still being
worked on and debated by scientists in all nations.53
The evolution of geopolitics through the space programs is still only a fraction of the
story. NASA also engaged and awed the public with several maneuvers to raise institutional
awareness, probably in a bid to restore the conditions of the attention it enjoyed during Apollo.
The Pioneer 10 and 11 space probes are the standard bearers of NASA’s public platform; both
carried a plaque bearing a message from humanity for a would-be intelligent extraterrestrial
interceptor. The twin plaques depicted, among other things,54 a map of the Solar System relative
to the locations of prominent interstellar objects and the likenesses of a man and a woman.
Voyager 2 carried a similar message and also bore a record of famous musical pieces from
around the world, sounds of natural phenomena like ocean waves and animals, and a greeting
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spoken in fifty-five different languages.55 These were certainly not sent out to achieve any
practical objectives – the small size relative to the universe and the fact that they would stop
emitting signals shortly beyond the realms of the Solar System renders any chance of an
extraterrestrial encounter extremely small. Moreover, if such an event were to take place, it
would be many millions, probably billions, of years in the future. However, the symbolic weight
of Earthlings sending interstellar communiqués had a palpable impact on the cultural
mainstream. The most prominent examples are some of the resulting Star Trek episodes and
movies that deal with the outcome of aliens meeting these same space probes hundreds of years
into the future.56
An even more direct link to Star Trek can be found in the introduction of the first
functional Space Shuttle in 1976. The original name was supposed to be Constitution but Star
Trek fans sent NASA a torrent of letters under which NASA relented and changed the name to
Enterprise after the flagship of the United Federation of Planets in the Star Trek series.57
Because of this and NASA’s desire to heighten public interest, the entire cast was invited to
attend a ceremony during the official rollout.58
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Through the 1970s and 1980s, NASA reset itself on a successful balanced path. Many of
its ambitious goals had been realized and the public had a rejuvenated interest. A comparison of
this timeline with Table 1 indicates a correlation between these events and a rising and restored
budget. This suggests that NASA’s outreach to the culture and the world community at least
partially addressed the issues of declining prominence and shrinking budget. The strongest
evidence of this is seen in NASA’s repeated ability to evade criticism by pooling foreign

contributions to its budget. But we can move beyond the mere correlation in the graph59 by
looking at the content of budget reports for certain years. In 1974, a whole new category in the
NASA budget breakdown emerged called Cross-Agency Support Programs.60 This was a turning
point of sorts as it indicates the official institutionalization of the transnational ethos into space
policy.61
However, these striking developments did not signify the end of this process. The Cold
War, though winding down, still maintained a dominating presence in the minds of politicians. In
1985, the Space Shuttle carried two Israeli astronauts despite them having no prior training for
spaceflight and there being no Israeli space program; under the same conditions, the Soviet
Union sent two Syrians and, later on, Iranians along with a Russian crew for their own countermission of sorts.62 But with the end of the Cold War, the tone changed as dramatically as it had
in 1969. With the end of a bipolar world by the beginning of the 1990s,63 the biggest foreign
policy concerns that could impact NASA operations evaporated and NASA with agencies around
the world pooled their resources and ingenuity to launch one of the grandest projects in the
history of space exploration.
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IV. The International Space Station and the Comet
The commitment to the creation of international ties to foreign space programs continued
in the following decade following the end of the Soviet Union in 1989. Because of the versatile
and agile Space Shuttle, NASA enjoyed a great variety of mission planning and took its
participation in other space programs to another level. The Russian Mir space station benefitted
from several cargo runs from American shuttle missions and in 1997 even required assistance for
several vital repairs after an accidental collision with another spacecraft.64 NASA also rescued
and repaired a Japanese satellite in 1996 by intercepting and capturing it while in orbit.65
Prominent scientists from around the world gained more access into NASA’s inner circles as
well: the 1990 deployment of the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) required a wide network of
scientists and facilities arrayed around the globe.66 But attendance in these maintenance
operations and hints of a slow uptick in international participation mark only the smaller morphs
in spaceflight ideology. The principle change in this phase was a redefined remnant of Cold War
space policy from the decade before.
In 1984, NASA drew plans to build a huge American space station in part as a response
to the Soviet Mir. In the 1984 State of the Union address, President Ronald Reagan unveiled the
project which was deemed Space Station Freedom. In the beginning, this gained momentum as it
was fortuitously positioned in the middle of a precipitous upsurge in defense funding caused by
the 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) which was President Reagan’s attempt to circumvent
the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine by developing the ability to intercept and
64
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destroy Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) midflight with a combination of terrestrial,
atmospheric, and space weapons platforms. But SDI, along with the space station, was delayed
well into the next administration as successive reports questioned and outright attacked the
project’s feasibility. Ultimately, SDI died essentially in 1987 when a study concluded the plan
was not possible with existing technology.67 Since future administrations did not see space as
grounds ripe for warfare – because of a combination of technological hurdles and space treaties
put into place decades before – space funding declined. Over the following years, the support for
Space Station Freedom correlatively eroded; it was hit with a series of cuts that forced
successively compromising redesigns. In 1991, a committee in the House of Representatives
voted to cancel it outright.68 Though this decision was reversed in later days, by 1993, the project
lost all support when the Clinton Administration would not approve of any of NASA’s proposed
revisions.69
At the same time, other key players in space exploration (the recently formed Japanese
Aerospace Exploration Agency or JAXA, the ESA, and the RKA) were contemplating and
pursuing their own homegrown space station aspirations.70 Coincidentally, these projects were
all plagued with budget clashes that led to near cancellations. Because of this, leaders from all
four space programs worked to create a new project that would be named the International Space
Station (ISS) after Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin
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announced a finalized agreement on September 2, 1993.71 Through the ISS, these space
programs preserved the original objectives by scaling back projects to a cost acceptable to their
home governments and by contributing component laboratory modules for shared use and
access.72 Indeed, some astute critics suggest that perhaps this attempt to skirt the disapproval of
thrifty politicians has been too successful; the cost of the ISS to America today has far exceeded
the original estimates of Space Station Freedom that drew so much ire and despite this, there is
significant momentum to extend the mission of the ISS by another five years.73
There are obvious cultural undertones that arose correspondingly with the creation of an
internationally driven space station. The message of Star Trek communicated the virtues of a
utopian future where global cooperation in space was an essential step in human progress and the
unprecedented collaboration that went into the ISS carries the obvious hallmarks of this. The
parallels were not lost on Star Trek writers either. The ISS was featured several times as a plot
device and Commander Benjamin Sisko, the leader of a 24th century space station which
functioned as the nexus of intergalactic relations in Star Trek: Deep Space Nine, displayed a
model of the ISS in his office, seemingly intended to illustrate that it was an early ancestor to the
spirit of the future one world government’s mission to serve the interests of all people and
races.74 The idea of space exploration as being on the leading edge of human innovation was not
just a futuristic view espoused by science fiction writers. In addition to the high profile peace
symbolism of international convocations in space, another one of the principle arguments for the
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manned space program was that experimentation done in a zero-gravity environment could have
humanitarian implications and potentially lead to cures for diseases, more efficient agricultural
techniques, and the creation of new synthetic materials.75 Though impressive, even these
developments were eclipsed in 1994 when NASA profited from a once in a lifetime opportunity
to add a new dimension to this notion of being an advocate of humanity.
In 1993, astronomers Carolyn and Eugene Shoemaker and David Levy discovered an odd
comet that appeared oddly deformed. Soon after, scientists realized that it was slightly elongated
because tidal forces from Jupiter were tearing it apart and that it was bound to hit the planet in
1994. The excitement over this discovery reached a fever pitch in the scientific community and
in all levels of society as no human had ever witnessed a collision on this magnitude before.76 As
the comet neared Jupiter, it was split into nine pieces that impacted separately and provided a
hitherto unmatched spectacle of luminous explosions that left a string of impact scars across the
surface.77 Recent scientific theories about the extinction of the dinosaurs involved a stellar body
smaller than Shoemaker-Levy 9 so the apocalyptic overtones of this mission were particularly
sharp.78 NASA wasted no time in capitalizing upon this event by entrancing the public with
Earth-sized craters that were inflicted against the Solar System’s most massive planet and
reported that the impact of the largest single fragment released more than 600 times the energy of
the world’s nuclear arsenals combined. Scientists also began doing academic work concerning
meteor, comet, and asteroid impacts in light of the newfound attention. A particularly
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provocative study released in the same year reported that there is a higher chance of dying in a
collision than in an airplane crash.79
The upshot of these events became evident in the following months and years. Before,
NASA maintained a program designed to track and map small bodies that intersected with
Earth’s orbit or near-Earth objects (NEOs). The project sought to identify and give advance
warning of objects that could potentially collide with Earth in light of the revelations of a giant
impact crater on the Yucatan peninsula that dated back to the final extinction of the dinosaurs.
While the project might have attracted academic interest, the attention it received from the public
was minimal. With the Jupiter event attracting public attention, NASA responded with the
establishment of the Lincoln Near-Earth Asteroid Research (LINEAR) program in 1996.
LINEAR has identified over 200,000 asteroids, and over 2000 NEOs accounting for the
overwhelming majority of the work done in this field.80 In addition to scientific research, the new
threats drew the interest of Congress which held hearings shortly after the Jupiter collision in
order to explore possible techniques to destroy or alter the course of an object on an impact
course with Earth. With LINEAR and other like projects keeping closer tabs on the sky, the
public actually confronted a near miss asteroid situation when scientists detected the half
kilometer wide asteroid 1996 JA1ten days before it passed between the Earth and the moon.81
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The public continued to take interest in NEO detection but in two years, awareness
reached new heights. In 1998, two films8283 (Deep Impact and Armageddon) were released in the
summer blockbuster months that dealt with the subject of humanity confronting an impact
extinction. Both plots begin with a large object headed for Earth that was discovered too late.
The protagonists unfold in the drama amidst the backdrop of a harried NASA that scrambles to
find a way to head off the danger. Scientists, elated by the weight of Hollywood pushing this
issue into the mainstream, were quick to offer their own perspectives. While many felt that
Armageddon took a few too many liberties with creative license, Deep Impact was acclaimed for
its realistic depictions; this might have been expected as its creators had consulted a team of
NASA experts.84 The influence of these experts is clearly seen in the plot as the comet was
discovered early on but only by an amateur astronomer who died in a car accident on the way to
report the results; when someone else took notice several months later, it was too late. This
reflected reality: until recently, the majority of the identifications of small heavenly objects were
done by backyard astronomers.85 Still, all scientists agreed that apathy and the existing
underdeveloped technology presented a lethal combination; the chance of spotting such a threat
from space was miniscule and any attempt to deflect it would most likely be futile.86
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With the movies in 1998 energizing the public, NASA went on the offensive. It pushed
for the furtherance of the NEO monitoring programs by releasing more high profile stories to the
media87 and by forging new alliances in Congress. This time, NASA sought help from
Republicans. Representative Dana Rohrabacher called the timing of the movies with the first
potential catastrophic impact “uncanny” and implored Congress to not view the 1996 encounter
as a false alarm but rather to “look at that as a fair warning to those of us on Earth that we need
to pay attention to this threat of asteroids.”88 In 1997, President Bill Clinton canceled an
experimental mission meant to test a prototype system that could potentially alter the orbital
course of an asteroid.89 Sensing that the public might be taking the threat more seriously now,
Representative Rohrabacher accused the White House of putting the Earth in the path of an
impending apocalypse:

… While NASA likes to talk about its effort on this issue… it isn’t just talking
the talk. We’re going to have to talk about the funding for this asteroid survey,
which has been much less than has been recommended… At the same time,
there’s no trouble at NASA for finding $50 million that could be spent on a
satellite that will enable us to watch the Earth from a distance, as the Vice
President decided. So NASA can’t find the full $5 million that we [need] to
chart out objects out there that are dangerous to the Earth but it can come up
with $50 million like that, if Al Gore, Vice President Al Gore, has some
harebrained idea about watching the Earth from a distance. I guess we could all
sit back then and watch the Earth from a distance. I guess we could all sit back
then and watch the Earth from a distance as it’s being pulverized by asteroid.
Wouldn’t that be a wonderful picture to watch?90

While the anti-asteroid program remained canceled, this outing in Congress demonstrates
NASA’s ability to adapt to the changing cultural and political landscape. It also represents a
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recent offshoot, if not an outright evolutionary step of internationalism; the message strongly
implies that NASA’s science efforts cannot stay complacent or misguided for the stakes of its
mission is the world and humanity’s continued survival. In recent years, the issue of collision
catastrophe has made its way to the agenda at United Nations meetings with NASA scientists
leading the call for global attention to this matter.91

VI. Conclusion
The history shows that NASA’s quest to overcome the considerable political challenges
that emerged after Apollo is a part of a distinct directorial theme of internationalism.
Additionally, it shows that NASA retained its role in the eye of the public as an important
instrument of social progress. NASA’s vulnerabilities in a disruptive environment were
addressed by a plan to look beyond national borders for aid; through extended, forty year attempt
to protect its interests, NASA evolved. The first stage was a move conceived from necessity as
NASA hurried to steady itself upon the space programs of other nations after the sudden slashes
to its support. These first forays into the unfamiliar world of cooperation in space exploration
through events like the ASTP led to a repeating series of other missions cast in the same mold
and reified international collaboration into the institutional mandate. International joint projects
in the space sciences, originally an aberration became a dominant feature. With these
arrangements in place, undertakings like the ISS deployed them into an unprecedentedly
widened realm.
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The change in cultural attitudes towards space and its relation to nationalism can be
measured against a quantifiable procession in projects and budget but the less palpable
undercurrents deserve equal mention. The growth of internationalism in space exploration
corresponded with changing cultural attitudes. In the beginning, a few idealistic scientists
seemed to have transnational aspirations but this was suppressed or lost in early Cold War
tensions. As events at home and around the world led to attempts at reconciliation, the idea of
international cooperation took root in the mass media in venues like Star Trek. This did not just
manifest alone in the operations of NASA; both NASA and the popular culture developed an
active relationship with the ability to affect each other (e.g. Star Trek episodes and the first Space
Shuttle). With some astronomical luck in later decades, NASA manipulated the situation of
Shoemaker Levy-9 and launched new set of programs as the mainstream took note of an always
present menace from outer space; this directly permitted NASA’s effective insistence that
American space technologies would not just develop international relations but may one day be
the key to the endurance of humankind.
But instead of ending here, it might be a beneficial exercise to step back even further and
look at these events not just in a chronology but ruminate about their position in the entire sphere
of science. Scholars have identified the 20th century as turning point in the nature of scientific
advancement. With the world wars and the need to create complicated technologies rapidly (e.g.
The Manhattan Project), science moved beyond the domain of the privileged elite and became a
foremost matter of government policy. Previously, revolutions in science might come from an
individual character (e.g. Charles Darwin or Isaac Newton) but with the state actively pursuing
massive undertakings, a likewise enormous budget and armada of humanpower marginalized the
role of individual contributions. Understanding that one of the byproducts of this shift (generally

called “Big Science”) is that the state became the de facto dictator of scientific progress, some
pondered the motivations and results. A convincing argument made by scholars such as Walter
A. McDougall claimed that policy makers, especially after Sputnik, sought spectacular leaps in
technology as a mode to enhance state status and prestige.92 The article concludes by saying that
space was just another avenue for a state to fight its battles and that the competition of nations
persisted despite the hopes of idealists.
The experience of the moon race confirms this point as NASA at its inception was all
about scoring humanity firsts before the competition. However, with the victory won,
McDougall argues the government shed its interest and moved on, still the same ideologically
despite the shared experience of the moon landing. But as this study demonstrates, there are
other factors to consider. NASA’s position as the darling of a multi-partisan spirit persevered
despite the initial unease and through this, NASA still managed to exert some sway in future
political situations and, since McDougall wrote his article, a clear legacy of internationalist space
exploration has emerged. Moreover, while the article thoroughly evaluates the role of the United
States and the Soviet Union, it only glances upon the different needs of other states. While
statecraft in the extremes of a bipolar world may have remained arguably static, there is an
overwhelming amount of evidence presented here that indicates this did not hold true for other
nations. Prestige through “one-upsmanship” may be the rule for even less powerful actors but at
least in some cases of space exploration, this is subsumed by the need to reach out and cooperate
to achieve that end. One of NASA’s most significant effects since 1969 is to play the role of
enabler for the space programs of other nations; the competitive spirit is blunted when one is
forced to share the victory with another. Furthermore, it is hard to deny the deluge of events that
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modified the culture to see the world and space exploration in transnational terms; surely states
usually bow to overwhelming cultural pressures. Finally, the budgetary commitment of Congress
still grew despite the absence of a real competition.
With this in mind, a focus on the highest levels of state alone does not appear sufficient
enough to characterize modern science except in cases where it functions as a homogeneous
actor. This might present another somewhat unaddressed problem as it means that the notion of
“Big Science” seems to work best only when the state brings to bear the weight of its unified
entirety. Since NASA’s history exhibits a condensed period where government interest peaked
and sharply declined, we can make several inferences about the big science model. Even though
NASA lost its deep budget after 1969, it gained freedom as the disinterested federal government
saw no reason to dictate mission goals since there was nothing left to be gained. This is how
NASA steadily forged ahead and gained approval from the government to pursue its many
international projects in the last forty years and subsequently, evolve separately from the
mainline political ideology. At the same time, because the government lost its stake, the
institution decelerated and shrunk after a period of being accommodated to the inflated capacity
granted by its old central relevance. Because NASA was used to its outsized capacity, it retained
and attempted to maintain the momentum of its temporal and fleeting expansion. This quest led
NASA to seek collaboration from other bodies with similar objectives. A rough evaluation of
other scientific fields suggests that this might be a recurring development. The Superconducting
Super Collider (SSC), a political statement planned to be the largest particle accelerator ever
built, was abandoned by Congress halfway through construction after the dissolution of the
Soviet Union. One of the principle arguments that led to the SSC’s abandonment was that

scientists could instead go to the Europe’s planned Large Hadron Collider (LHC) and do the
same type of work.93
Since World War II, policymakers and historians have claimed that “big science” was a
preeminent causal factor in the uncontrollable budget growth of the postwar years.94 In the case
of NASA, this is not true. The immediate and sudden budget cuts prove the state was capable of
quickly moving forward. In addition to the loss of full state backing, the congregation of
scientific collaborators can disable efforts just as much as it enables. One of the reasons for the
ISS’s fiscal profligacy is that the Russian space program has failed many of its obligations and
contributions.95 With the most recent timeline for construction, upon completion of the space
station, there will only be five years left until its planned termination date. “Big Science”
projects that are created without the explicit devotion of the government suffer from a host of
limitations. A NASA administrator seemed to recognize the issues in this in a 1998 hearing about
NASA’s role in the 21st century. Speaking of the delays surrounding the ISS, Marcia S. Smith,
former executive director for the National Commission on Space opined:
It may be time to reevaluate international cooperation in large space projects…
Does international cooperation really achieve cost savings? Should such projects
have fewer participants to simplify management? How can political and funding
be maintained in each partner country throughout the lifespan of a project? What
problems result when space projects are tied to foreign policy agendas?96

Despite these misgivings, reliance on international cooperation for space exploration at all levels
is here to stay at least in the near future. It is the only resort of an institution cast aside like
NASA after the moon landing and it has led to the realization of significant and otherwise
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impossible leaps in our understanding of the universe. However, what the long term holds for
NASA and space exploration is uncertain. Global cooperation through the relations crafted in the
previous decades continues unabated. But space programs from countries, like China97, that are
outsiders to this network of western first world nations, seem poised to cause a reversion to
where space policy once again becomes a preeminent concern of a nationally driven competitive
policy.
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